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Global evidence of extreme intuitive moral prejudice against atheists 34	
Mounting evidence supports longstanding claims that religions can extend cooperative 35	
networks1-9. However, religious prosociality may have a strongly parochial component9. 36	
Moreover, aspects of religion may promote or exacerbate conflict with those outside a 37	
given religious group, promoting regional violence10, intergroup conflict11, as well as 38	
tacit prejudice against nonbelievers12,13. Anti-atheist prejudice—a growing concern in 39	
increasingly secular societies14—affects employment, elections, family life, and broader 40	
social inclusion12,13. Preliminary work in the USA suggests that anti-atheist prejudice 41	
stems, in part, from deeply rooted intuitions about religion’s putatively necessary role in 42	
morality. However, the cross-cultural prevalence and magnitude—as well as 43	
intracultural demographic stability—of such intuitions, as manifested in intuitive 44	
associations of immorality with atheists, remain unclear. Here, we quantify moral 45	
distrust of atheists by applying well-tested measures in a large global sample (N=3256, 46	
13 diverse countries). Consistent with cultural evolutionary theories of religion and 47	
morality, people in most—but not all—countries viewed extreme moral violations as 48	
representative of atheists. Notably, anti-atheist prejudice was even evident among atheist 49	
participants around the world. Results contrast with recent polls that do not find self-50	
reported moral prejudice against atheists in highly secular countries15, and imply that the 51	
recent rise in secularism in Western countries has not overwritten intuitive anti-atheist 52	
prejudice. Entrenched moral suspicion of atheists suggests that religion’s powerful 53	
influence on moral judgements persists, even among nonbelievers in secular societies. 54	
Speculation about whether morality depends on religious belief has a long history. 55	
The ancient Chinese philosopher Mozi claimed that belief in ghosts was essential for 56	
	  Intuitive Moral Distrust of Atheists 3	
moral restraint16. In Plato’s Euthyphro17, Socrates debated whether morality can even be 57	
properly defined without reference to divine preference. Dostoevsky18 famously 58	
questioned whether moral prohibitions could carry weight without belief in a deity. 59	
Modern investigations reflect this perceived link between belief in gods and morality, as 60	
recent small sample studies in North America suggest deep moral suspicion of 61	
individuals who do not believe in gods13,19.  62	
Evolutionary theories of religion predict that prejudice against atheists may persist 63	
even in secular cultures, either as part of a suite of adaptations linking belief to within-64	
group cooperation20, or as a consequence of culturally transmitted21 and entrenched pro-65	
religious norms22. Indeed, recent studies suggest religions evolved in part by supporting 66	
trust and cooperation among coreligionists15,23,24. Signals of religiosity can even extend 67	
trust across religions among believers, though not to nonbelievers25. On the other hand, 68	
classic social psychological work26 predicts that only believers will be prejudiced against 69	
atheists, and that distrust of atheists would not be apparent in secular societies. To date, 70	
these two perspectives have not been directly contrasted, and the global prevalence of 71	
intuitive anti-atheist prejudice and its persistence among atheists themselves is currently 72	
unknown. A recent Pew survey suggests a relationship between country-wide levels of 73	
religious belief and explicit judgments that morality requires religion15. However, people 74	
often lack introspective access to their intuitions, and respond to appear socially 75	
desirable. As such, little is known about the potential cross-cultural ubiquity of intuitions 76	
linking religion and morality. 77	
Here, we test a prediction derived from a cultural evolutionary model of 78	
religion22: that anti-atheist prejudice remains globally prevalent, even in secular societies 79	
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and among atheists. In contrast to previous studies, we quantify levels of anti-atheist 80	
distrust using well-tested measures of intuitive information processing that can be 81	
adapted for studying prejudice in a large and diverse cross-cultural sample, while 82	
adjusting for individual differences in level of religious belief, demographic covariates, 83	
and country-level dependencies in responses. Our sample is drawn from 13 countries on 5 84	
continents. We chose these countries because they 1) exhibit substantial country-level 85	
variability in average religious belief including both highly secular societies (e.g., 86	
Netherlands, Czech Republic, Finland, China) and highly religious ones (e.g., United 87	
Arab Emirates, Mauritius, India. Supplementary Table 3 shows average belief in gods 88	
across countries); 2) represent diverse dominant religions and religious histories, 89	
including countries with Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, and secular majorities; and 90	
3) represent diverse cultural, political, socioeconomic, historical, and geographical 91	
contexts. This diverse sample allowed us to extend our investigation well beyond the 92	
WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, democratic) samples that predominate 93	
the social sciences27. 94	
We developed a measure to assess extreme anti-atheist prejudice using a simple 95	
experimental design that targets intuitive biases19. In this task, participants read a 96	
description of a man who tortures animals as a child, then as an adult exhibits escalating 97	
violence culminating with the murder and mutilation of five homeless people. Then, 98	
participants judged whether it is more probable that the villain was: A) a teacher, or B) a 99	
teacher who is also (manipulated between subjects) a religious believer/ does not believe 100	
in gods. Thus, no individual participant is directly asked whether they think the 101	
perpetrator is or is not a believer. Instead, the conjunction fallacy28 rates (choosing option 102	
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B—a logically incorrect answer) between conditions can be used to indirectly infer the 103	
degree to which a description of a serial murderer is intuitively seen as more 104	
representative of religious people or atheists, respectively. Full stimuli appear in the 105	
Supplement. In our preregistration of methods and hypotheses before data collection 106	
commenced (https://osf.io/f6tcr/), we hypothesized both universality and variability 107	
across countries, such that moral distrust of atheists would be evident in all sites, but the 108	
strongest intuitive religion-morality links would be observed in the most strongly 109	
religious samples.  110	
We conducted identical experiments in all 13 sites. We targeted at least 100 111	
participants per experimental condition (anti-atheist bias vs. anti-religious bias). After 112	
filtering out inattentive participants (13%) and incomplete responses, there were a total of 113	
3256 participants for final analysis (69% female, Age 16-70: M = 25.07, SD = 7.84), with 114	
a median of 162 participants per country (range: 129-993). Participants came from 115	
diverse societies and included both student and general population samples (Supplement).  116	
Because our data represent a shared experimental design across sites with 117	
participants nested within countries, we utilized a multilevel (hierarchical) modeling 118	
approach. Specifically, our hierarchical Bayesian model29 quantifies the extent to which 119	
people view gross immorality (animal torture, serial murder, and mutilation) as more 120	
representative of atheists than of believers, both overall and within each country, 121	
adjusting for individual levels of belief in God, gender, age, and perceived 122	
socioeconomic status (all standardized). Additionally, the model adjusts for country-level 123	
dependencies by modeling the intercept and slope of anti-atheist prejudice as random 124	
across countries (Supplement). Full model coefficients appear in Table 1. We observed 125	
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substantial heterogeneity in overall conjunction fallacy performance across countries. 126	
Because our primary focus was on degrees of intuitive moral distrust of atheists (in 127	
contrast to believers) across countries, we do not speculate further about sources of 128	
heterogeneity in overall performance, and instead focus on experimental condition 129	
differences within countries. 130	
Our results offer strong evidence of extreme intuitive moral prejudice against 131	
atheists. Our model predicts overall conjunction error rate probability of .58 for atheist 132	
targets (95% highest posterior density interval [.48, .68]), but only .30 [.25, .34] for 133	
religious targets, Relative Risk (RR) = 1.96 [1.53, 2.37], posterior probability of atheist 134	
target errors exceeding religious target errors (henceforth posterior probability) exceeds 135	
.999. Thus, people overall are roughly twice as likely to view extreme immorality as 136	
representative of atheists, relative to believers. Importantly, the effects hold even after 137	
adjusting for country variability in the strength of intuitive moral prejudice and 138	
individual-level variability in demographics. Figure 1 and Table 2 summarize model 139	
predicted conjunction error probabilities across sites for atheist and religious targets. 140	
Consistent with predictions, extreme intuitive moral distrust of atheists is both globally 141	
evident and variable in its magnitude across countries. 142	
  143	
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Figure 1. Across 13 countries, serial murder was seen as more representative of 144	
atheists than of religious believers. Predicted error probabilities are presented for the 145	
total estimate and all 13 sites.  146	
 147	
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Table 1. Full model summary. Age, gender, subjective socioeconomic status, and 149	
participant belief in God were standardized. Target was coded: atheist = 1, religious = 0. 150	
95% highest posterior density interval illustrates uncertainty around posterior means, and 151	
indexes the interval in which the 95% most credible estimates lie. 152	
 153	
 coefficient SDcoef 95% HPDI 
   Low High 
Fixed Effects     
Belief 0.10 0.06 -0.03 0.23 
Age 0.11 0.05  0.01 0.19 
Female 0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.11 
SSES 0.03 0.04 -0.06 0.11 
Belief x Target 0.11 0.09 -0.07 0.29 
Random Intercepts    
Total -0.86 0.12 -1.09 -0.63 
Australia -0.90 0.19 -1.27 -0.51 
China -0.28 0.22 -0.70  0.15 
Czech -0.99 0.19 -1.38 -0.62 
Finland -1.01 0.10 -1.22 -0.82 
Hong Kong -0.70 0.21 -1.11 -0.28 
India -0.66 0.15 -0.95 -0.37 
Mauritius -0.93 0.19 -1.31 -0.57 
Netherlands -0.94 0.18 -1.30 -0.57 
New Zealand -0.82 0.20 -1.21 -0.43 
Singapore -0.90 0.21 -1.31 -0.50 
UAE -1.17 0.26 -1.66 -0.67 
UK -0.87 0.20 -1.26 -0.48 
USA -1.08 0.21 -1.50 -0.69 
Random Slopes (Target)    
Total 1.19 0.22  0.74 1.62 
Australia 1.06 0.28  0.51 1.62 
China 1.15 0.30  0.55 1.71 
Czech 1.10 0.27  0.55 1.63 
Finland 0.13 0.15 -0.14 0.43 
Hong Kong 1.16 0.31  0.56 1.75 
India 1.87 0.23  1.44 2.35 
Mauritius 1.13 0.29  0.57 1.72 
Netherlands 0.91 0.26  0.39 1.42 
New Zealand 0.52 0.29 -0.06 1.08 
Singapore 2.02 0.32  1.41 2.65 
UAE 2.06 0.36  1.35 2.76 
UK 0.80 0.29  0.21 1.34 
USA 1.66 0.29  1.13 2.24 154	
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Table 2: Model summary at mean belief in God (50.91 out of 100). Predicted 155	
conjunction error probabilities for both atheist and religious targets [with 95% highest 156	
posterior density intervals], along with relative risks [95% HPDI], and posterior 157	
probability of atheist target error rates exceeding religious target error rates, Pr(A > R). 158	
Relative risk = Pr(atheist target error) / Pr(religious target error). UAE = United Arab 159	
Emirates, UK = the United Kingdom, USA = United States of America. 160	
 161	
 N Atheist Religious Relative Risk pr(A >R) 
Total 
 
3256 0.58 
[0.48, 0.68] 
0.30 
[0.25, 0.34] 
1.96  
[1.53, 2.37] 
> .999 
Australia 
 
158 0.54 
[0.43, 0.65] 
0.29 
[0.22, 0.37] 
1.89  
[1.33, 2.55] 
> .999 
China 
 
207 0.7 
[0.62, 0.79] 
0.43 
[0.32, 0.53] 
1.65  
[1.23, 2.09] 
> .999 
Czech 
 
187 0.53 
[0.43, 0.62] 
0.27 
[0.20, 0.34] 
1.97  
[1.37, 2.66] 
> .999 
Finland 993 0.29 
[0.25, 0.34] 
0.27 
[0.23, 0.31] 
1.11  
[0.89, 1.34] 
.822 
Hong Kong 129 0.61 
[0.5, 0.71] 
0.33 
[0.25, 0.43] 
1.87  
[1.3, 2.48] 
> .999 
India 395 0.77 
[0.69, 0.83] 
0.34 
[0.28, 0.41] 
2.27  
[1.82, 2.74] 
> .999 
Mauritius 161 0.55 
[0.43, 0.67] 
0.28 
[0.21, 0.36] 
1.96  
[1.36, 2.64] 
> .999 
Netherlands 213 0.49 
[0.40, 0.59] 
0.28 
[0.21, 0.35] 
1.77  
[1.23, 2.34] 
.999 
New Zealand 161 0.43 
[0.33, 0.53] 
0.31 
[0.23, 0.39] 
1.41  
[0.92, 1.92] 
.964 
Singapore 162 0.75 
[0.66, 0.84] 
0.29 
[0.21, 0.37] 
2.63  
[1.84, 3.47] 
> .999 
UAE 144 0.71 
[0.60, 0.81] 
0.24 
[0.15, 0.32] 
3.06  
[1.95, 4.39] 
> .999 
UK 148 0.48 
[0.38, 0.59] 
0.30 
[0.22, 0.38] 
1.65  
[1.09, 2.21] 
.997 
USA 198 0.64 
[0.54, 0.73] 
0.26 
[0.18, 0.34] 
2.56  
[1.80, 3.48] 
> .999 
  162	
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Surprisingly, after adjusting for substantial latent country-level dependencies 163	
between sites, the within-country interaction between individual belief in God and 164	
conjunction error rates across targets is weak (posterior probability = .88. See Table 1). 165	
Thus, while anti-atheist prejudice varies strongly by country, such prejudice is largely 166	
robust across the spectrum of participant religiosity within countries; both high and low 167	
believers are about twice as likely to commit conjunction errors for atheist targets than 168	
for religious targets (Figure 2). Further, we examined posterior model predictions for 169	
atheists (those rating their belief in God at 0 out of 100). Among atheists, our model 170	
predicts overall conjunction error rate probability of .52 for atheist targets [.40, .64], but 171	
only .28 [.22, .33] for religious targets, RR = 1.91 [1.41, 2.48] (posterior probability > 172	
.999). Effects hold even in highly secular countries such as Australia, China, the Czech 173	
Republic, the Netherlands, and the UK: even atheists are predicted to intuitively associate 174	
serial murder with atheists more than with believers in these countries, all posterior 175	
probabilities exceeding .98. Indeed, only in Finland (posterior probability = .48) and to a 176	
lesser extent New Zealand (posterior probability = .90) was the evidence of intuitive anti-177	
atheist prejudice among atheists less conclusive (Full inferences at both minimum and 178	
maximum belief appear in the Supplement). As a robustness check of intuitive moral 179	
distrust of atheists among atheists, we conducted a second analysis isolating all 180	
participants across sites who rated their belief in God at zero (N = 553) and explored 181	
overall atheist intuitive moral distrust of atheists (experimental condition treated as fixed) 182	
across sites (varying intercepts of country). Once again, atheist participants showed 183	
higher conjunction error rates for atheist targets, .61 [.23, .95], than for religious targets, 184	
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.50 [.12, .88] (posterior probability = .999). Thus, consistent with theoretical predictions, 185	
even atheists intuitively associate immorality with atheists more than with believers.   186	
 187	
 188	
Figure 2. Predicted effect of participant belief in God, marginalized across countries 189	
and adjusting for individual gender, age, and subjective socioeconomic status. Bold lines 190	
are overall estimates, blurred lines display 500 best-fit lines sampled randomly from the 191	
posterior to depict estimate uncertainty.  192	
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To address potential methodological confounds and alternative explanations for 193	
our findings, we conducted three additional experiments (we note that although our 194	
primary cross cultural investigation was preregistered, the followup studies were not). 195	
Full details of all three studies appear in the Supplement, but they are briefly summarized 196	
here. First, our cross-cultural experimental manipulation tested only extreme moral 197	
violations and pitted a target “who does not believe in god(s)” against “a religious 198	
believer,” perhaps confounding notions of belief in god and the broader construct of 199	
religiosity. Study S1 found that even when the experiment more symmetrically 200	
manipulates belief vs. disbelief in god(s) and tests a more minor moral violation (not 201	
paying for dinner in a restaurant), people still associate immorality more with atheists 202	
than with believers (posterior probability = .981). 203	
Second, our primary cross-cultural tests pitted a disbeliever in god(s) against a 204	
religious believer. It is possible, however, that people are morally distrustful of 205	
disbelievers in general, rather than of people who disbelieve in gods specifically. Study 206	
S2 used the same extreme moral violation as our main analysis and found that people 207	
were more likely to intuitively assume that a perpetrator of moral evil was someone who 208	
disbelieved in God than someone who disbelieved in evolution, the accuracy of 209	
horoscopes, the safety of vaccines, or the reality of global warming (all posterior 210	
probabilities between .956 and .9997). 211	
Finally, it is possible that people may intuitively associate certain specific moral 212	
violations, such as child molestation, with religious individuals rather than atheists. 213	
However, Study S3 found that people intuitively assume that a priest who molests young 214	
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boys for decades is more likely to be a priest who does not believe in God than a priest 215	
who believes in God (posterior probability = .998). 216	
In sum, participants intuitively assume that the perpetrators of immoral acts are 217	
probable atheists. These effects appeared across religiously diverse societies, including 218	
countries with Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Muslim, and nonreligious majorities, showing 219	
that intuitive moral prejudice against atheists is not exclusive to Abrahamic or 220	
monotheistic majority societies. To the contrary, intuitive anti-atheist prejudice 221	
generalizes to largely secular societies, and appears globally evident even among atheists.  222	
Notably, our primary experimental paradigm used extreme examples of 223	
immorality where anti-atheist prejudice would presumably be less explicitly defensible. 224	
We tested moral prejudice using vicious acts of cruelty (animal torture, serial murder, and 225	
mutilation), which participants—including atheist participants—nonetheless intuitively 226	
associated with atheists. Combined, these results imply that across the world, religious 227	
belief is intuitively viewed as a necessary safeguard against the temptations of gross 228	
immoral conduct, and atheists are broadly perceived as potentially morally depraved and 229	
dangerous. Viewed differently, people viewed belief in a god as a sufficient moral buffer 230	
to inhibit immoral behavior. 231	
Our results highlight a stark divergence between lay and scientific perceptions of 232	
the relationship between religion and morality. Although religion likely influences many 233	
moral outcomes and judgments3,23,24, core moral instincts appear to emerge largely 234	
independent of religion30,31. Additionally, highly secular societies are among the most 235	
stable and cooperative on earth14. Nonetheless, our findings reveal widespread suspicion 236	
that morality requires belief in a god. For many people, including many atheists, the 237	
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answer to Dostoevsky’s18 question, “Without God….It means everything is permitted 238	
now, one can do anything?” is “yes”, inasmuch “everything” refers to acts of extreme 239	
immorality. 240	
Religions underpin large-scale intragroup cooperation3, but also promote distrust 241	
of nonbelievers13,19 who are excluded from such religious moral communities3,25. Does 242	
rising secularism14,32 moderate effects - as atheist norms become stronger within 243	
societies? The present findings suggest that intuitive moral suspicion of atheists is 244	
culturally widespread though not universal. Given that intuitive anti-atheist biases may 245	
transfer across moral domains19 (Studies S1 & S3), the resilience of moral prejudice 246	
against atheists reveals a potential barrier to the full acceptance of this growing segment32 247	
of the global population. Consistent with predictions derived from cultural evolutionary 248	
theories of religion and morality22, extreme intuitive moral distrust of atheists is evident 249	
globally, among believers and atheists in both religious and secular societies. Even as 250	
secularism reduces overt religiosity in many places14, religion has apparently still left a 251	
deep and abiding mark on human moral intuitions.  252	
Methods 253	
Data collection proceeded among teams acting locally across all thirteen 254	
countries. Local ethics approval was completed by individual research teams within each 255	
country.  256	
The experiment employed a version of the representativeness heuristic28. In the 257	
classic version of this task, participants are given a description of a politically liberal, 258	
single woman. When asked whether it is more likely that she is A) a bank teller, or B) a 259	
bank teller who is active in the feminist movement, participants tend to erroneously pick 260	
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option B. Although logically incorrect (there are necessarily at least as many bank tellers 261	
as bank tellers who are feminists), the description seems more representative of the 262	
double identity provided in option B, leading people to intuitively choose that option 263	
(termed the conjunction fallacy). By independently varying the contents of the 264	
description and the identities implied by option B, researchers can assess the degree to 265	
which people intuitively view a given description as representative of different 266	
identities19.  267	
We generated a representativeness heuristic task to quantify the degree to which 268	
people around the world intuitively view religion as necessary for the inhibition of gross 269	
immoral behavior. We provided a description of an immoral person who initially tortures 270	
animals and eventually kills people for thrills (see Supplement), and then asked whether it 271	
was more probable that the perpetrator was A) a teacher, or B) a teacher who either 272	
(manipulated between subjects) does not believe in God, or is a religious believer. Higher 273	
conjunction fallacy rates (picking option B) in the atheist condition indicate that people 274	
intuitively view serial murder as more representative of atheists than of religious 275	
believers 19. This manipulation allowed us to test the relationship between intuitive 276	
distrust of atheists and personal religious belief, while adjusting for countrywide variation 277	
in this relationship, as well as demographic covariates. 278	
Analytic strategy. The nested structure of our data required a multilevel (e.g., 279	
hierarchical) modeling strategy to generate aggregate inferences. Failure to adopt such a 280	
strategy can lead to serious and potentially misleading inferential errors33. Our analyses 281	
relied on Bayesian hierarchical modeling29 using the rethinking package34 in R. Bayesian 282	
approaches provide researchers a number of pragmatic benefits35, including the use of 283	
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intuitive statements (e.g., posterior probabilities) about the probability of experimental 284	
manipulations producing effects across countries, as well as the relative credibility or 285	
plausibility of different potential parameter values29,36. In addition, hierarchical (e.g., 286	
multilevel) models can mitigate some problems associated with multiple comparisons37 287	
—comparisons that could be especially concerning in the present study, which evaluated 288	
intuitive moral distrust of atheists across 13 countries while adjusting for individual 289	
demographics. Further, Bayesian estimation allowed us to represent the estimate 290	
uncertainty using highest posterior density intervals which represent the range in which 291	
the most credible parameter values lie. This approach is in contrast to frequentist 292	
confidence intervals, which only present a range of possible values that would contain the 293	
true parameter value a known proportion of the time were this study repeated a very large 294	
number of times, although frequentist confidence intervals are often intuitively 295	
misunderstood as if they had the properties of Bayesian posterior density intervals38. Our 296	
primary inferences are drawn from probing samples from the posterior from a single 297	
hierarchical model. In it, we modeled random intercepts of country and modeled effects 298	
of target (atheist vs. believer) as random across country, with all other factors fixed 299	
across country. Alternative model specifications did not appreciably change inferences. 300	
Data Availability. Data and code are freely available at https://osf.io/f0upy/ 301	
Competing Interests. We declare no competing interests.  302	
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Supplementary Methods 
Baseline Methods 
 
Here is the baseline set of methods. Some countries tweaked elements of this (e.g., used 
different religious categories, measured political attitudes differently). These differences 
are noted in their data, translated methods, and in the data summaries. 
 
 
Methods 
 
The methods are simple: participants answered one representativeness heuristic question, 
three other logic puzzles that acted as a smokescreen, one item included to ensure people 
are paying attention (e.g., Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009), and basic 
demographics. 
 
 
I. Representativeness Heuristic task. 
 
Participants began with a single representativeness heuristic task with a description of an 
unambiguously immoral character. Between subjects, we manipulated the contents of 
Option #2: 
 
When a man was young, he began inflicting harm on animals. It started 
with just pulling the wings off flies, but eventually progressed to torturing 
stray cats and other animals in his neighborhood. 
 
As an adult, the man found that he did not get much thrill from harming 
animals, so he began hurting people instead. He has killed 5 homeless 
people that he abducted from poor neighborhoods in his home city. Their 
dismembered bodies are currently buried in his basement. 
 
Which is more probable? 
1. The man is a teacher 
2. The man is a teacher and [does not believe in any gods. / is a religious 
believer.] 
 
II. Attention Check. 
 
Here is a different type of question. SKIP THE NEXT QUESTION. It is 
only included to ensure that you are paying attention and reading 
directions. Do not leave an answer for the question about US presidents. 
 
Who is the current President of the United States of America? 
a) Barack Obama 
b) Mitt Romney 
c) Steve Perry 
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d) George Washington 
 
We dropped participants who actually answered this question. 
 
 
III. Distractor Items 
 
 
A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost? ____cents 
  
If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 
100 machines to make 100 widgets? _____minutes 
  
In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. 
If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the 
patch to cover half of the lake? _____days 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. Suspicion check 
 
 
 
What do you think this study is mainly about so far? 
 
a) Stereotyping and prejudice 
b) Logic and reasoning 
c) Language fluency 
d) Emotion perception 
e) Memory 
 
 
V. Demographics 
 
 
 
1. How old are you? _________________________ 
 
2. What is your gender? 
a. Male 
b. Female 
c. Other 
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3. What is your religious affiliation? 
a. Christian (Catholic) 
b. Christian (Baptist) 
c. Christian (Other) 
d. Hindu 
e. Buddhist 
f. Muslim 
g. Jewish 
h. Sikh 
i. None 
j. Atheist 
k. Agnostic 
l. Other (Please specify) 
 
 
4. How strongly do you believe in God or gods (from 0-100)?  To clarify, if you are 
certain that God (or gods) does not exist, please put “0” and if you are certain that 
God (or gods) does exist, then put “100.” _____________ 
 
5. How would you describe your race/ethnicity? 
 
a. White/Caucasian 
b. Hispanic/Latino 
c. Black/African American 
d. American Indian/Alaskan Native 
e. Asian 
f. Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 
g. Mixed 
h. Other: _________________________ 
 
 
 
6. We are interested in your political beliefs. Would you consider yourself more 
liberal or conservative? Select an option below: 
a. Very liberal 
b. Liberal 
c. Slightly liberal 
d. Moderate 
e. Slightly conservative 
f. Conservative 
g. Very conservative 
 
7. We are interested in how you perceive your life. Think of a ladder representing 
where people stand in [insert country here]. At the top of the ladder are the people 
who are the best off–those who have the most money, the most education, and the 
most respected jobs. At the bottom are the people who are the worst off–who have 
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the least money, least education, and the least respected jobs or no job. The higher 
up you are on this ladder, the closer you are to the people at the very top; the 
lower you are, the closer you are to the people at the very bottom. Imagine this 
rating scale represents the ladder. Where would you place yourself, relative to 
other people in [insert country here]? 
a. Rating scale from 0 (Bottom) to 10 (Top) 
 
8. Location: City ____________________ State/Province ____________________ 
 
9.  “What is the highest degree of education you have completed?” 
 
a. Some high school 
b. Completed high school or equivalent 
c. Some university/college 
d. Completed university/college 
e. Some postgraduate work 
f. Completed a postgraduate degree 
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Sampling and Demographics 
 
Additional sampling and demographic information is presented in Supplementary Tables 
1-4 
 
Additional modeling details 
 
All analyses were conducted in R34,39-41. 
 
Overall, 35.9% of the sample made errors in the control condition, whereas 64.1% made 
errors in the experimental Atheist condition (Χ2=163.512, df=1, Φ=.225,  p<.001). See 
Supplementary Table 2.  
 
There was substantial heterogeneity by country in the error rates.  Notably, 31.13% of the 
total sample (n=993) were from Finland, where the error rate in the experimental 
condition was only 28% which is similar to the baseline error rate of 26.7% in this 
country (Χ2=0.140, df=1, Φ=.014 · p=.709).  Country-level differences are in accordance 
with our experimental hypothesis that culturally evolved country level differences in anti-
atheist prejudice.  
 
The proportion of errors in both experimental conditions for each country are giving in 
Supplementary Table 2. 
 
We next turned to estimate country level differences in religious belief.  We first 
calculated an Interclass Correlation Coefficient for Belief in God by Country using a 
random coefficient model.  This estimates the proportion of within country variation in 
religious belief relative to between country variation at the level of participants. The 
ICCBelief  = 0.335, indicating high levels of country-level clustering in religious belief, a 
finding consistent with other studies investigating global variation in religious belief  
(e.g., the World Values Survey). 
 
Evidence of marked country-level heterogeneity both in experimental outcomes and in 
religious beliefs suggests the need to appropriately handle country dependencies. 
 
We modelled the expected error rates using a Bayesian multilevel model in R using 
McElreath’s Rethinking package29. Bayesian regression yields results with transparent 
and intuitive probabilistic interpretations: the posterior distributions that are generated are 
probabilistic distributions for modelled associations, which are conditional on the data, 
model, and priors. Priors for the effects modelled as fixed in the current study weakly 
regularizing, with a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1. Varying slopes and 
intercepts used adaptively regularizing priors29. The full model code is available at 
https://osf.io/f0upy/ 
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Access to materials and data 
 
All materials and methods (including translated materials for some countries), as well as 
all raw data, is available at the following link: 
 
https://osf.io/f0upy/ 
 
 
Our initial study registration can be found here: 
 
https://osf.io/f6tcr/ 
 
Our experimental methods were uploaded on November 12, 2013. Due to a technical 
oversight, formal preregistration did not occur until August 26, 2015. Experimental 
protocol went unchanged during this time. 
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Supplementary Notes 
 
Atheist and maximum belief inferences 
 
In the main manuscript, we report some inferences regarding atheist participants. To do 
so, we used our full model posterior and evaluated predictions at minimum level of belief 
on God (0 out of 100). Supplementary Table 5 summarizes inferences across all sites. 
 
In the main manuscript, we report some inferences regarding participants at maximum 
belief in God. To do so, we used our full model posterior and evaluated predictions at 
maximum level of belief on God (100 out of 100). Supplementary Table 6 summarizes 
inferences across all sites. 
 
 1	
 2	
  3	
 Supplement: Intuitive Moral Distrust of Atheists  30 
Supplementary Studies 4	
 5	
Study S1 6	
  7	
Overview. Our primary cross-cultural experiment tested whether, when given a 8	
description of someone engaging in animal torture and serial murder, people intuitively 9	
assumed that the perpetrator was an atheist. Notably, this experiment focused on a rather 10	
extreme moral violation. In addition, the primary experimental contrast across conditions 11	
was between someone who “does not believe in any gods” and someone who “is a 12	
religious believer.” This phrasing may have led participants to conflate issues of belief in 13	
a god with the broader construct of religiosity, which may connote additional norms and 14	
behaviors. To simultaneously address both of these concerns, we conducted a study in 15	
which we tested whether participants intuitively assume that the perpetrator of a more 16	
mundane moral violation is also an atheist. For symmetrical framing, we contrasted 17	
conditions in which the conjunction target was framed in terms of either belief or 18	
disbelief in God. 19	
 20	
Method. We recruited 205 American participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (Age: 21	
M = 34.4, SD = 11.2; Belief in God [0-100]: M = 43.4, SD = 41.2; 44% female). We 22	
presented participants with the following vignette of a mundane moral violation and 23	
conjunction question [experimental conditions in brackets]: 24	
 25	
“A 42 year-old woman was out of town on vacation. She had dinner at a 26	
restaurant, finished her meal, and left without paying the bill.  27	
 28	
Which is more probable? 29	
a) The woman is a teacher 30	
b) The woman is a teacher and [does/ does not] believe in God” 31	
 32	
Results. As with main analyses, we utilized Bayesian estimation and present model 33	
predicted conjunction error probabilities [with 95% HPDIs]. Given a description of a 34	
mundane moral violation, participants were more likely to commit conjunction errors for 35	
targets who do not believe in God, .31 [.22, .40], than targets who do believe in God, .19 36	
[.12, .26], posterior probability = .99. 37	
 38	
Summary. Study S1 suggests that moral distrust is evident in—but not exclusive to—39	
extreme moral violations. In addition, it appears that inferences about belief in God, 40	
rather than religiosity more broadly, are sufficient to generate these effects. 41	
  42	
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Study S2 43	
  44	
Overview. Our primary cross-cultural experiment suggested that people intuitively 45	
assume that the perpetrators are likely to disbelieve in gods. It is possible that this 46	
intuition was not driven by an association between religion and moral restraint, but rather 47	
by a general disbelief bias: that, if all we know is something someone does not believe, 48	
we cannot infer what they do believe, and as such treat them as potential moral wildcards. 49	
Study S2 used the same extreme moral violation as the primary analysis and the 50	
conjunction task pitted targets who disbelieve in God against disbelievers of other stripes. 51	
We chose a disparate assortment of disbeliefs that span the political and religious spectra. 52	
 53	
Method. We recruited 394 American participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (Age: 54	
M = 33.6, SD = 10.5; Belief in God [0-100]: M = 41.3, SD = 40.8; 45% female). We 55	
presented participants with the same moral violation used in the main analysis, and 56	
provided potential targets who disbelieve in God, evolution, horoscopes, global warming, 57	
or vaccine safety (manipulated between subjects). 58	
 59	
Results. As with main analyses, we utilized Bayesian estimation and present model 60	
predicted conjunction error probabilities [with 95% HPDIs]. Given a description of a 61	
mundane moral violation, participants were more likely to commit conjunction errors for 62	
targets who do not believe in God than targets who disbelieve in evolution, horoscopes, 63	
vaccine safety, or global warming, see Supplementary Table 7. 64	
 65	
 66	
Summary. Our main study suggests extreme moral distrust of people who do not believe 67	
in gods. Study S2 suggests that this effect does not readily generalize to various other 68	
specific disbeliefs. 69	
  70	
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Study S3 71	
  72	
Overview. Our primary cross-cultural investigation suggested that extreme moral 73	
violations are intuitively associated with atheists. However, it is possible that other 74	
extreme moral violations might, in fact, suggest a religious perpetrator. Specifically, 75	
given the prominence of sex abuse scandals in the Catholic church, it is possible that 76	
people might intuitively assume that the perpetrators of chronic child molestation might 77	
in fact be men of the cloth. In addition, none of our previous studies explored whether 78	
moral impropriety might outweigh other overt cues that one is religious in people’s 79	
intuitive attributions of atheism to moral violators. Study S3 tested whether people would 80	
assume that a serial child molester who also happens to be a priest is, in fact, a priest who 81	
does not believe in God. 82	
 83	
Method. We recruited 265 participants from the University of Kentucky campus in 84	
Lexington, KY, USA (Age: M = 21.7, SD = 6.7; Belief in God [0-100]: M = 70.8, SD = 85	
34.1; 57% female). We presented participants with the following vignette [experimental 86	
conditions in brackets]: 87	
 88	
“Keith is a well-respected figure in his community. All his friends 89	
describe him as a very caring and friendly 60-year-old-man. However, 90	
Keith actually spends most of his free time luring young boys into his 91	
office to molest them. In the past 10 years, Keith has molested over 30 92	
boys.  93	
  94	
Which is more probable?  95	
a) Keith is a priest 96	
b) Keith is a priest and [believes/ does not believe] in God” 97	
 98	
Results. As with main analyses, we utilized Bayesian estimation and present model 99	
predicted conjunction error probabilities [with 95% HPDIs]. Given a description of a 100	
serial child molesting priest, participants were more likely to commit conjunction errors 101	
for targets who do not believe in God, .57 [.49, .65], than targets who do believe in God, 102	
.40 [.32, .48], posterior probability = .998. 103	
 104	
Summary. Study S3 suggests that intuitive moral distrust extends to moral violations that 105	
could possibly be popularly associated with religious people (child molestation), given 106	
current events. Further, a description of immorality seemingly outweighed even overt 107	
evidence of religiosity, leading people to nonetheless assume that a perpetrator of serial 108	
child molestation does not believe in God, even though he is a priest. 109	
 110	
 111	
 112	
 113	
 114	
  115	
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Supplementary Tables 116	
Supplementary Table 1. Sampling details. 117	
 118	
Country Sample  English Payment Contact 
Australia student Y credit ilan.dar-nimrod@sydney.edu.au 
China community N money buchtel@eduhk.hk 
Czech Rep. student N credit eva.klocova@gmail.com 
Finland mixed N none tapani.riekki@helsinki.fi 
annika.svedholm@helsinki.fi 
Hong Kong student N lottery buchtel@eduhk.hk 
India community Y money will.gervais@uky.edu 
Mauritius community N none xygalatas@uconn.com 
Netherlands student N credit M.vanElk@uva.nl 
NZ student Y lottery joseph.bulbulia@gmail.com 
Singapore student Y credit jonathanramsay@unisim.edu.sg 
UAE student Y credit maveyard@aus.edu 
UK student Y lottery Ryan.McKay@rhul.ac.uk 
USA student Y candy will.gervais@uky.edu 
 119	
 120	
 121	
 122	
Supplementary Table 2. Raw descriptive statistics: Proportion conjunction errors 123	
(with 95% CIs) for atheist and religious targets. 124	
 125	
Site Atheist Error 
Rate 
95% CI Religious 
Error Rate 
95% CI 
Australia .53 [.42, .65] .29 [.19, .40] 
China .69 [.59, .78] .51 [.41, .62] 
Czech Rep. .51 [.40, .61] .24 [.16, .34] 
Finland .28 [.24, .32] .26 [.22, .30] 
Hong Kong .67 [.56, .77] .34 [.23, .46] 
India .80 [.74, .86] .39 [.32, .46] 
Mauritius .56 [.43, .68] .27 [.19, .37] 
Netherlands .43 [.34, .53] .25 [.17, .35] 
New Zealand .38 [.28, .49] .29 [.20, .40] 
Singapore .78 [.68, .87] .28 [.19, .39] 
UAE .77 [.66, .86] .17 [.09, .28] 
UK .47 [.35, .58] .29 [.19, .41] 
USA .65 [.56, .74] .25 [.17, .35] 
Aggregate .52 [.50, .54] .30 [.27, .32] 
 126	
 127	
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 128	
 129	
 130	
Supplementary Table 3. General demographics. 131	
 132	
 133	
Country Age  
M [SD]  
Female  
% 
Belief        
M [SD] 
Educ.  
Mdn 
SSES     
M [SD] 
Cons. Pol. 
M [SD] 
Australia 20.0 
[5.12] 
70 53.9 [38.5] Some univ 6.60 [1.48] 3.53 
[1.41] 
China 29.8 
[5.95] 
63 28.7 [35.7] University 6.84 [1.57] 3.38 
[1.43] 
Czech Rep. 22.0 
[2.08] 
68 47.2 [39.8] -- 3.53 [1.15] 4.47 
[1.15] 
Finland 28.1 
[8.22] 
73 31.3 [35.3] University 5.99 [1.59] -- 
Hong Kong 21.3 
[3.39] 
80 63.2 [36.1] Some univ 4.90 [1.66] 2.89 
[1.08] 
India 32.3 
[9.44] 
65 85.0 [26.9] University 4.93 [1.51] 3.34 
[1.41] 
Mauritius 21.7 
[1.33] 
47 76.5 [39.2] Some univ 4.07 [4.06] 2.86 
[1.42] 
Netherlands 19.5 
[2.14] 
75 21.2 [29.9] University 6.78 [1.45] 4.14 
[2.75] 
New Zealand 23.1 
[7.94] 
67 42.0 [39.5] Some univ 6.01 [1.60] 2.69 
[1.60] 
Singapore 20.8 
[1.69] 
68 69.8 [30.3] HS* 5.53 [1.48] 3.57 
[1.30] 
UAE 19.9 
[1.56] 
60 94.3 [18.9] HS* 6.80 [1.34] -- 
UK 25.1 
[9.29] 
67 35.1 [37.1] Some univ 6.29 [1.78] 3.24 
[1.23] 
USA 19.1 
[2.33] 
80 83.4 [29.2] Some univ 6.39 [1.50] 3.98 
[1.56] 
Aggregate 25.2 
[7.99] 
69 51.2 [41.4] Some univ 5.58 [2.02] 3.49 
[1.63] 
 134	
*Median education was listed as “Completed High School” despite the fact that all 135	
students were at university (“Some University”). See Methods Packet in this document 136	
for disambiguation of items and scoring. SSES = subjective socioeconomic status. Cons. 137	
Pol = political attitudes, from 1 (Very liberal) to 7 (very conservative).  138	
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 139	
Supplementary Table 4. Religious demographics (%). 140	
 141	
Country Christian Hindu Buddhist Muslim None Atheist Agnostic Other 
Australia 41 2 4 4 14 15 15 5 
China 4 -- 18 -- -- 75* 3 
Czech  36 4 .5 1 3 31 18 6.5 
Finland 42   .4 25 18 11 3.6 
HK 33 -- 3 -- -- 60* 4 
India 17 69 .2 10 .2 1 1 1.6 
Mauritius 25 43 2 22 3 4 .6 .4 
Neth.         
NZ 22 .6 3 1 71 2 0 .4 
Singapore 28 7 30 5 30*  
UAE 4 4 1 84 .6* 6.4 
UK 20 2 0 6 27 22 15 8 
USA 79 0 .4 .4 10 4 5 1.2 
 142	
* Notes: China and Hong Kong used slightly different religious ID options. Among other 143	
things, Atheist/agnostic was an option, rather than atheist or agnostic as separate choices. 144	
Dashes (--) indicate an option was not provided. Singapore used a “freethinker” category 145	
instead of none, atheist, and agnostic. UAE used “Non-Religious Other philosophy not 146	
listed here” category. Data taken from final data set, after dropping inattentive 147	
participants. Specific denominational demographics for the Netherlands are available in 148	
full posted dataset. Please contact Michiel van Elk for coding information. 149	
 150	
  151	
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Supplementary Table 5: Model summary at minimum belief in God (0 out of 100). 152	
Predicted conjunction error probabilities for both atheist and religious targets [with 95% 153	
highest posterior density intervals], along with relative risks [95% HPDI], and posterior 154	
probability of atheist target error rates exceeding religious target error rates, pr(A > R). 155	
Relative risk = pr(atheist target error) / pr(religious target error). UAE = United Arab 156	
Emirates, UK = the United Kingdom, USA = United States of America. 157	
 158	
 Atheist Religious Relative Risk pr(A >R) 
Total 
 
0.52   
[0.4, 0.64] 
0.27   
[0.22, 0.33] 
1.91  
[1.40, 2.45] 
> .999 
Australia 
 
0.48   
[0.35, 0.59] 
0.27   
[0.19, 0.35] 
1.81  
[1.16, 2.51] 
.999 
China 
 
0.65   
[0.55, 0.74] 
0.40   
[0.30, 0.51] 
1.63  
[1.18, 2.09] 
> .999 
Czech Rep. 
 
0.46   
[0.36, 0.56] 
0.25   
[0.17, 0.32] 
1.90  
[1.25, 2.65] 
> .999 
Finland 0.24   
[0.2, 0.28] 
0.24   
[0.20, 0.28] 
1.00  
[0.77, 1.24] 
.489 
Hong Kong 0.55   
[0.43, 0.67] 
0.31   
[0.22, 0.40] 
1.83  
[1.19, 2.53] 
.999 
India 0.72   
[0.62, 0.8] 
0.32  
 [0.24, 0.40] 
2.31  
[1.69, 2.95] 
> .999 
Mauritius 0.49   
[0.36, 0.61] 
0.26  
 [0.18, 0.34] 
1.92  
[1.19, 2.73] 
.999 
Netherlands 0.43   
[0.34, 0.53] 
0.26   
[0.19, 0.33] 
1.70  
[1.16, 2.34] 
.998 
New Zealand 0.36   
[0.26, 0.46] 
0.28   
[0.20, 0.36] 
1.33  
[0.83, 1.86] 
.905 
Singapore 0.7   
[0.58, 0.81] 
0.27  
 [0.18, 0.36] 
2.68  
[1.78, 3.79] 
> .999 
UAE 0.65   
[0.52, 0.78] 
0.22   
[0.13, 0.31] 
3.12  
[1.81, 4.84] 
> .999 
UK 0.42   
[0.32, 0.53] 
0.27   
[0.19, 0.35] 
1.58  
[1, 2.19] 
.988 
USA 0.58   
[0.46, 0.69] 
0.23   
[0.15, 0.32] 
2.56  
[1.63, 3.68] 
> .999 
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 161	
Supplementary Table 6: Model summary at maximum belief in God (100 out of 162	
100). Predicted conjunction error probabilities for both atheist and religious targets [with 163	
95% highest posterior density intervals], along with relative risks [95% HPDI], and 164	
posterior probability of atheist target error rates exceeding religious target error rates, 165	
pr(A > R). Relative risk = pr(atheist target error) / pr(religious target error). UAE = 166	
United Arab Emirates, UK = the United Kingdom, USA = United States of America. 167	
 168	
 Atheist Religious Relative Risk pr(A >R) 
Total 
 
0.64  
[0.53, 0.74] 
0.32  
[0.27, 0.38] 
1.98  
[1.55, 2.41] 
> .999 
Australia 
 
0.6  
[0.49, 0.71] 
0.32  
[0.24, 0.41] 
1.93  
[1.32, 2.57] 
> .999 
China 
 
0.75  
[0.66, 0.84] 
0.46  
[0.35, 0.58] 
1.65  
[1.25, 2.14] 
> .999 
Czech Rep. 
 
0.59  
[0.48, 0.69] 
0.3  
[0.22, 0.38] 
2.02  
[1.41, 2.7] 
> .999 
Finland 0.35  
[0.28, 0.41] 
0.29 
 [0.24, 0.35] 
1.21  
[0.89, 1.54] 
.904 
Hong Kong 0.67  
[0.56, 0.77] 
0.36  
[0.27, 0.46] 
1.88  
[1.31, 2.47] 
> .999 
India 0.81  
[0.75, 0.87] 
0.37  
[0.30, 0.44] 
2.21  
[1.81, 2.63] 
> .999 
Mauritius 0.61  
[0.5, 0.72] 
0.31  
[0.23, 0.39] 
2.01  
[1.42, 2.65] 
> .999 
Netherlands 0.55  
[0.44, 0.65] 
0.31 
 [0.22, 0.40] 
1.84  
[1.26, 2.45] 
> .999 
New Zealand 0.49  
[0.37, 0.6] 
0.33  
[0.24, 0.43] 
1.49  
[0.97, 2.06] 
.977 
Singapore 0.79  
[0.71, 0.87] 
0.32  
[0.23, 0.40] 
2.56  
[1.86, 3.36] 
> .999 
UAE 0.76  
[0.66, 0.84] 
0.26  
[0.17, 0.35] 
2.97  
[1.98, 4.17] 
> .999 
UK 0.54  
[0.43, 0.66] 
0.32  
[0.23, 0.42] 
1.73  
[1.16, 2.34] 
0.997 
USA 0.7 
[0.61, 0.78] 
0.28  
[0.20, 0.36] 
2.56  
[1.85, 3.41] 
> .999 
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Supplementary Table 7: Predicted conjunction error rates across a variety of 170	
specific disbeliefs 171	
 172	
Specific 
Disbelief 
Point Low 
HPDI 
High 
HPDI 
Posterior probability 
(relative to god) 
God 0.55 0.43 0.66 --- 
evolution 0.26 0.15 0.36 >.999 
horoscopes 0.32 0.22 0.44 >.999 
vaccines 0.25 0.14 0.36 >.999 
warming 0.38 0.27 0.50 0.98 
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